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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the lower court err in granting Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment on the assumption that the record 
did not show any disputed fact as to whether defendant John R. 
Ward was acting as an individual physician rather than an 
University of Utah employee or was estopped from claiming immunity? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was originally commenced in April of 1984 
by the plaintiff against the defendant claiming that from 1980 
through December of 19 82, defendant, Dr. Ward, undertook the 
responsibility for the medical care and treatment of the 
plaintiff and that he was negligent in providing such care. 
Shortly thereafter the defendant moved to dismiss the 
Complaint on the basis that a legal action could not be main-
tained against him in his individual capacity in that the 
defendant was allegedly acting within his scope of employment 
at the University of Utah Medical Center. 
After hearing arguments by both sides, the Honorable 
Leonard H. Russon ordered that Defendant's motion be continued 
without date and that Plaintiff's counsel would have the 
right to take the deposition of the defendant on the limited 
issue of whether his treatment of the plaintiff was undertaken 
and performed within the scope of his employment by the University 
of Utah. Accordingly, the deposition of defendant was subse-
quently taken. 
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Defendnat then moved for Summary Judgment based upon the 
affidavits, documents, and deposition contained in the record. 
The lower court after hearing argument entered a Memorandum 
Decision finding that the "care and treatment of the plaintiff 
was in the capacity of an employee of the University Hospital 
and was within the scope of such employment." The Court, based 
upon this conclusion, entered Summary Judgment in favor of the 
defendant and against the plaintiff dismissing Plaintiff's 
cause of action. It is from this Order of Summary Judgment 
that the present appeal is now taken by Plaintiff-Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following Statement of Facts is based upon the affi-
davits of the plaintiff, the defendant, Dr. G.Richard Lee, 
various billing documents contained in the record, and the 
deposition of the defendant. 
1. Beginning in July of 1956 the defendnat John R. Ward 
was employed as a professor and Division Head of Rheumatology 
in the School of Medicine by the University of Utah (Lee 
Affidavit). 
2. Since that time Defendant has been continuously 
employed by the University of Utah in its Medical Center. There 
is no written contract between the University of Utah and the 
defendant. (Ward Depo., p. 15; Defendant's Answer to Plaintiff!s 
First Set of Interrogatories No. 3) . 
3. The plaintiff in 1979 was referred by her physician, 
Dr. Edward Heyes, to the defendant for the purpose of being 
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treated for rheumatoid arthritis. Dr. Ward continued treating 
the plaintiff for a period of approximately two years until 
December of 1982. During this period of time Plaintiff was 
not informed that Dr. Ward was acting as an employee of the 
University Hospital or was acting in any other capacity other 
than as a private physician treating a private patient. 
(Affidavit of Plaintiff, 1[3) . 
4. Plaintiff stated in her affidavit that she received 
bills from Dr. Ward personally and made checks payable to him 
personally. Such checks were returned to her endorsed by what 
Plaintiff believed to be Dr. Wardfs signature. It was not 
until the mid-1982 that bills began to request that she make 
payment to the Division of Rheumatology. A copy of the checks 
and billing statements are attached to the Affidavit of the 
plaintiff and to Defendant's Response to Request for Production 
of Documents. 
5. Dr. Ward in his deposition stated that he is paid 
every two weeks by the University of Utah. He stated that he 
had no outside source of income which is generated from the 
care of patients outside of the University itself. However, 
he admitted that he contributed to a retirement plan for the 
self-employed other than through the University. (Ward Depo., 
p. 8) . 
6. Dr. Ward in his deposition stated that his salary is 
based on a negotiated income through the department chairmen 
and the Dean of the School of Medicine and that some of the funds 
to pay his salary are generated through the "Physicians Billing 
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Office" which is run by the Dean!s Office, Ward stated that 
guidelines are established by the Department which sets a 
minimum, a base, and a maximum income for each University 
professor. Ward stated: 
That by virtue of University policy, some of 
us who started out at a very low salary and because 
of inability to increase salary say by more than 
three or six percent, and intervals where no increases 
were possible, salary supplementation within these 
guidelines comes from Physicians Billing Office and 
is sent to us as a check. From this there are no 
retirement benefits that are paid by the University. 
(Ward Depo., pp. 9-10). 
7. Dr. Ward denied having actually signed the checks 
which appeared to have his signature as an endorsement. He 
stated that the Physicians Billing Office is authorized to 
sign his name on checks. (Ward Depo., p. 12). 
8. Dr. Ward stated that his percentage of income generated 
from paying patients varies considerably from year to year and 
that in 19 84, for example, it would be about twenty-five percent. 
(Ward Depo., p. 13). 
9. Dr. Ward stated that he could not recall talking with 
the plaintiff concerning billing procedures and the cost involved 
at any time during his treatment of her. Only in cases other 
than ordinary routine office visits does Dr. Ward inform his 
patients of extra charges or other business-related transactions. 
(Id.) 
10. This lawsuit was commenced in May of 1984. Because 
Plaintiff did not believe that Dr. Ward was affiliated with 
the University of Utah,no notice of claim pursuant to §63-30-13, 
U.C.A. was filed as to either Dr. Ward or the University of Utah. 
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11. The lower court, in granting Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, entered the following Memorandum Decision: 
The defendant's Motion for Dismissal is granted. 
The testimony under oath by way of affidavit of John R. 
Ward and G. Richard Lee, as well as the deposition of 
John R. Ward, indicate that Dr. Ward's care and 
treatment of the plaintiff was in the capacity of an 
employee of the University Hospital and was within 
the scope of such employment. Plaintiff's Complaint 
does not allege gross negligence, fraud or malice. 
University Hospital is a state-owned institution and 
by statute falls within the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act of 1965. 63-30-4 governs this matter. Defendant 
will prepare the order. 
12. The lower court subsequently entered a "Summary 
Judgment" in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff. 
It is from this order that the present appeal is taken. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The lower court erred in granting Summary Judgment to 
the defendant since a factual question exists as to whether 
Defendant was acting as an individual physician at the time he 
was treating the plaintiff or whether he was acting as a 
governmental employee. Further, a factual question exists 
as to whether the defendant can rely upon the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act or whether his conduct and representations estop 
him from claiming its benefit. 
ARGUMENT 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN THAT MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT EXIST 
AS TO BOTH THE SCOPE OF DEFENDANT'S 
EMPLOYMENT AND ESTOPPEL AGAINST DEFENDANT. 
The creation of the Governmental Immunity Act by the 
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State Legislature has caused a reveral of traditional common 
law principles of employer-employee relationships. Under 
common law, an employer is only liable for the actions of 
its employee if that employee was acting within the scope of 
his employment. This principle of respondeat superior allowed 
a plaintiff to sue both the employer and the employee and to 
hold the former liable if the employee was within the "scope" 
required. The plaintiff in such a case would attempt to show 
facts evidencing the employee's link to the employer's 
business while, at the same time, the employer would attempt 
to show that the employee was acting on a lark of his own. 
In any event, the plaintiff in non-governmental cases can always 
sue the employee even if the employer is not liable. 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act completely changes the 
posture of these type of cases. Section 63-30-4 provides 
that no suit may be individually maintained against an 
employee of a governmental agency if that employee was acting 
within the scope of employment or under color or authority. 
Only in cases where the employee acted or failed to act due to 
fraud or malice may the employee be held individually liable. 
Section 63-30-4, U.C.A. In addition, the Governmental Immunity 
Act provides a series of procedural steps which must occur if a 
claim is to be made against the employing governmental entity 
including a claim and notice for injury (63-30-11 and 63-30-12) , 
a time limitation for the filing of such notice (63-30-13) and 
a time limitation as to the filing of an action after the claim 
has been denied. (63-30-15). In these type of cases, therefore, 
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it is possible that a plaintiff will have no remedy against 
either the employer or the employee if these procedural steps 
have not been performed. 
In the instant case the lower court held that the defendant 
was acting within the scope of his employment at the University 
of Utah and therefore was not individually liable to the plaintiff. 
The effect of such decision under the circumstances of this case 
is to deny the plaintiff any remedy against any entity since she 
did not follow the necessary claim procedures when proceeding 
against a governmental entity. Thus, this is not an abstract 
discussion as to whether an employee will be joined with an 
employer as a defendant but is a question of whether a cause 
of action of any type may be maintained against any defendant. 
The lower court erred in concluding as a matter of law that 
the defendant was protected by the Utah Government Immunity Act 
and was acting as an employee of the University of Utah at the 
time of treating the plaintiff. It is, of course, fundamental 
that doubts or uncertainties concerning issues of fact properly 
presented, or the nature of inferences to be drawn from the 
facts, are to be construed in a light favorable to the party 
opposing the summary judgment motion. Bowen v. Riverton City, 
656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982); Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332 
(Utah 1977). In addition, in negligence cases, summary judgment 
is appropriate in only the most clear instances. Webster v. 
Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983)- F.M.A, Acceptance Co. v. 
Leatherby Ins. Co., 594 P.2d 1332 fUtah 1979). 
Plaintiff asserts that at all times material to this dispute 
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defendant John Ward treated her in the capacity of a private 
physician. Dr. Ward relies upon the fact that he was a University 
employee during this period of time. He argued in the court 
below that any actions he took as to any patients necessarily 
required the conclusion that he was acting within his scope of 
employment at the University. However, there are sufficient 
facts in the record to require a different conclusion. First, 
the plaintiff was referred to Dr. Ward by her own physician and 
was not referred to the Arthritis Department at the University 
of Utah Medical Center. Second, Plaintiff was never informed 
by the defendant that he was acting as an employee of the 
University and not as a private treating physician. Third, 
for a period of over a year and a half all of the statements 
received by the plaintiff and the checks sent to Defendant 
were solely in the name of Dr. John Ward and not to or from the 
Division of Rheumatology. Fourth, the income derived from 
these type of patients varies from year to year and serves as 
additional supplemental income to the minimum base pay paid by 
the University of Utah. In other words, the more patients a 
University doctor sees the more income that physician earns each 
year. Finally, the defendant contributes to a Keogh Plan or 
other retirement plan for the self-employed through the Physician 
Billing Office and not through the University, 
The lower court should have allowed the question as to 
whether Dr. Ward was acting within the scope of his University 
employment to go to a trier of fact. It is basic law that the 
question of "scope of employment" is a factual determination. 
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It can only be decided in light of the evidence and circum-
stances of each case, Costa v. Able Distributors, Inc., 653 
P.2d 101 (Hawaii App. 1982); Hansen v. Skate Ranch, Inc., 641 
P.2d 517 (N.M. App. 1982); Morain v. Lollis, 371 P.2d 473 (Okla. 
1962); Gossett v. Simonson, 411 P.2d 277 (Ore. 1966) and 
Combined Insurance Co. of America v. Sinclair, 584 P.2d 1034 
(Wyo. 1978) . 
In Holve v. Draper, 505 P.2d 1265 (Ida. 1973) an automobile 
accident occurred in which the plaintiff maintained that an 
employee was liable for the employee's negligence because the 
employee was acting within the scope of employment at the time 
of the accident. The lower court entered summary judgment on 
behalf of the defendant and the plaintiff appealed. The Idaho 
Supreme Court reversed, stating the following: 
[W]e have examined the record and we find 
that the affidavits conflict on the material 
factual issue of whether, at the time of the 
accident, a master-servant relationship existed 
between Draper and Swanson. A motion for summary 
judgment must be denied where the affidavits 
conflict respecting issues of material fact. 
Id. at 1269. 
The lower court relied upon the affidavits of the defendant 
and G. Richard Lee in determining that Dr. Ward was acting within 
the scope of his employment at the time of the treatment. An 
examination of both of these affidavits, however, shows that 
they are merely conclusionary since they state that the activities 
carried out by Dr. Ward in his treatment of the plaintiff was 
within the scope of his employment. Such an affidavit cannot be 
considered in a motion for summary judgment since the conclusion 
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of scope of employment is the very issue before the court. 
To raise a genuine issue of fact, an affidavit must do more 
than reflect the affiant's opinions and conclusions. Water v. 
Rocky Mountain Recreation, 508 P.2d 538 (Utah L973) . Mere 
conclusions of ultimate facts and law and general allegations 
do not fulfill the requirements of affidavits filed with respect 
to motions for summary judgment. Pace v. Sagebrush Sales Co., 
560 P.2d 789 (Ariz. 1977). 
The mere fact that a person is employed at the time of an 
alleged incident does not per se mean that person is acting 
within the scope of his employment. There are numerous instances, 
for example, of governmental employees who may or may not be 
acting within the scope of their government employment. A city 
policeman who is hired as a security officer for a public 
function may or may not be considered an employee of the city 
during such time period. Belcher v. Spengel, 429 U.S. 118 (1976); 
Johnson v. Hackett, 284 F. Supp. 933 (D. Pa. 1968); Traver v. 
Meshriy, 627 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1980). 
Numerous state employees are now engaged in consultations 
with private clients some of which consultations occur at the 
physical facilities of the state and during the time period of 
state duty hours. University of Law professors, for example, 
frequently consult with private clients and lawfirms at the 
University Law School and during normal class hours. In such 
cases a factual question exists as to whether such professor 
is supplementing his own income as an individual or is receiving 
compensation as a professor by being allowed to retain additional 
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income from private practice. 
For these reasons, therefore, the lower court erred in 
concluding that as a matter of law the conclusionary statements 
made by the defendant and by a University employee overcame the 
factual disputes raised by Plaintiff in her affidavit and in 
the other evidence contained in the record. The lower court 
should have properly submitted these factual questions and 
their inferences to a trier of fact. 
A second alternate ground of error also exists. The 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act is an affirmative defense raised 
by the defendant. Had this case gone to trial Plaintiff would 
have claimed that she had been mislead by the actions of the 
defendant and the University of Utah in believing that she was 
being treated by a private physician and not by a state employee. 
Plaintiff would have alleged an estoppel to assert the Govern-
mental Immunity defense. Clearly, the elements needed for 
equitable estoppel are present in this case as is stated by 
the affidavit of the plaintiff since she was never informed of 
the true employment nature of defendant and relied upon this 
act of silence to her detriment in that she will, in effect, 
lose any cause of action against any defendant. Leaver v. Grose, 
610 P.2d 1262 (Utah 1980); Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor 
Control Commission, 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979). 
Further, estoppel has been held in the past by this Court 
to be a legitimate defense to the application of the various 
procedural requirements of the Utah Government Immunity Act. 
Rice v. Granite School District, 456 P.2d 159 (Utah 1969); 
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Whitaker v. Salt Lake City Corp., 522 P.2d 1252 (Utah 1974). 
Thus, in any event a factual issue exists as to whether 
the defendant is now estopped from being able to claim the 
benefits of the Governmental Immunity Act because of his 
alleged failure to inform the plaintiff as to the true employ-
ment relationship. 
CONCLUSION 
The record as it now comes before this court creates a 
factual question as to whether Dr. Ward was acting within the 
scope of his employment to such an extent that he is personally 
immune from suit by the plaintiff. If a mere conclusionary 
statement is all that is required by a state official or by a 
state employee then the traditional rule that scope of employ-
ment is a factual dispute will be totally abolished. Obviously, 
what an employee or an employer believes to be a scope of 
employment definition is only one factor for a trier of fact 
to consider in examining the total circumstances of the relation-
ship. Here, for example, it is entirely possible that a trier 
of fact would conclude that Dr. Ward was acting as a private 
physician on his own behalf at the time he treated the plaintiff. 
In any event, a substantial question of estoppel exists 
as to whether the defendant can now claim the benefits of 
the Governmental Immunity Act based upon his failure to inform 
the plaintiff that he was merely an employee of the University 
of Utah and that she should look to the University of Utah and 
the State of Utah for any problems which arose during the doctor-
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patient relationship. The conduct of the defendant and the 
alleged reliance by the plaintiff are clearly questions of 
fact which cannot be decided on summary judgment. 
For the preceding reasons, therefore, the judgment of the 
lower court must be reversed and the matter set for factual 
determination. 
Respectfully submitted, 
s John H. McDonald 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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APPENDIX 
MERLIN R. LYBBERT 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
GAIL PARSONS HEYES, 
Plaintiff, MOTION TO DISMISS 
vs. Civil No. C84-2750 
JOHN R. WARD, Judge Leonard H. Russon 
Defendant. 
Defendant John R. Ward moves the Court for its Order dis-
missing plaintiff's Complaint upon the grounds and for the 
reason that said defendant is, and was at all times mentioned 
in the Complaint, an employee of the University of Utah and said 
alleged acts occurred during the performance of his duties and 
within the scope of his employment, and under the provisions of 
Section 63-30-4, U.C.A., 1953 as amended, a legal action cannot 
be maintained against him in his individual capacity. 
This Motion is based in part upon the attached Affidavits 
of defendant John R. Ward and G. Richard Lee, Dean, University 
of Utah School of Medicine. 
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Dated this day of June, 1984. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & IvIARTINEAU 
~/ M e r l i n R. L y b b e r t 
A t t o r n e y s f o r D e f e n d a n t 
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MERLIN R. LYBBERT - A2029 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
GAIL PARSONS HEYES, 
Plaintiff, AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN R. WARD 
vs. Civil No. C84-2750 
JOHN R. WARD, Judge Leonard H. Russon 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
JOHN R. WARD, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. That he is the defendant named in the above-entitled 
action. 
2. That at all times mentioned in plaintiff1s Complaint 
he was an employee of the University of Utah School of Medicine, 
with the rank of Professor and Head of the Division of Rheu-
atology. 
3. That at all times mentioned in plaintiff's Complaint 
the treatment and care rendered to plaintiff was done in his 
capacity as an employee of the University of Utah and during 
the performance of his duties and within the scope of his em-
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ployment, as aforesaid. 
_2i 
John R. Ward, M.D. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to b e f o r e me t h i s J?f day of May, 
19 84. 
^ 
Notary Public 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
My Commission Expires 
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MERLIN R. LYBBERT - A2 02 9 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
GAIL PARSONS HEYES, 
Plaintiff, AFFIDAVIT OF 
G. RICHARD LEE 
vs. 
Civil No. C84-2750 
JOHN R. WARD, 
Judge Leonard H. Russon 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
G. RICHARD LEE, upon being first duly sworn, deposes 
and says: 
1. That since the 1st day of March, 1978, he has been 
the Dean of the University of Utah School of Medicine, with 
the rank of Professor, and as such is familiar with the status 
and terms of employment of physicians at the University. 
2. Beginning on the 1st day of July, 1956, John R. Ward, 
M.D., was employed as a Professor and Division Head of Rheuma-
tology in the School of Medicine by the University of Utah. 
3. That in connection with the services of Dr. John A. 
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Ward at the University of Utah, whether rendered in his capacity 
as a teacher of medical principles and procedures or in connec-
tion with the care and treatment of patients, such activities are 
carried out as a part of his duties as an employee of the Univer-
sity of Utah School of Medicine and within the scope of his em-
ployment. 
4, That his treatment and care of Gail Parsons Heyes commenc-
ing in September, 1980 through December 8, 1982, were undertaken 
and rendered in his capacity as an employee of the University of 
Utah Hospital and within the scope of that employment. 
G. R^ bchard Lee, JM.D. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /2-~ day of June, 
1984. 
s-jaajlt 0 flux*) 
Notary Public 
Residing at y/^ (jtA&JU &-JL / Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
/^//K 
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JOHN H. MCDONALD 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
965 East 4800 South, Suite 3J 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: 268-0877 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GAIL PARSONS HEYES, ) AFFIDAVIT OF GAIL 
) . PARSONS HEYES 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
JOHN R. WARD ) Civil No. C-84-2750 
Defendant. ) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
County of Salt Lake) 
COMES NOW the Gail Parsons Heyes, the affiant, and 
after being duly sworn upon oath deposes and says: 
1. That she is the Plaintiff in the above styled 
action. 
2. That in 1979 she was referred by her physician, Dr. 
Edward Heyes, to Dr. John Ward the Defendant herein to be treated 
for rheumatoid arthritis. 
3. That at the commencement of this physician/patient 
relationship the financial arrangements were made whereby she 
was to pay Dr. John Ward personally for his service and that at 
no time was she informed that Dr. Ward was acting as an employee 
of the University Hospital or was acting in any other capacity 
other than his capacity as a private physician treating a private 
patient. 
4. In furtherance of this relationship as a private 
physician treating a private patient, Plaintiff received bills 
from Dr. Ward personally and made checks payable to him personally, 
said checks being endorsed with what Plaintiff believed to be 
Dr. Ward's signature and copies of some of those checks are 
attached hereto and made a part of this affidavit by reference. 
It was not until mid 1982 that bills began to request that she 
make payment to the Division of Rheumatology. 
The affiant say not further. 
DATED this 11th day of October, 1984. 
GAIJXPARSONS HEYES • J 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 11th day of 
October, 1984. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Salt Lake City, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
9/13/87 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Gail Parsons Heyes, to Merlin 
R. Lybbert, Attorney for Defendant, 10 Exchance Place, Eleventh 
Floor, P.O. Box 3000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110, this 11th day 
of October, 1984. 
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SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: 5 21-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
GAIL PARSONS HEYES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
JOHN R. WARD, Civil No. C84-2750 
Defendant. Judge Leonard H. Russon 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss having been considered under 
the provisions of Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
having come on regularly for hearing before the above named 
Court on the 15th day of October, 19 84, the Honorable Leonard 
H. Russon, Judge presiding, and plaintiff having been repre-
sented by John H. McDonald, and defendant being represented by 
Merlin R. Lybbert, and the Court having heard oral argument of 
counsel and having considered the Affidavits, deposition, Inter-
rogatories, Answers to Interrogatories and Request for Production 
of Documents, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, 
now, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That defendant be granted Summary 
Judgment against the plaintiff, No Cause of Action, each party 
-1-
to bear his own costs, 
Dated this 
u 
day of €k=Hkaber, 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
onard H. Russon 
District Judge. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM THIS 
^(p day of Oetote*, 1&&4. 
John H. McDonald 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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